A Model for Android and iOS Applications Risk Calculation: CVSS Analysis
  and Enhancement Using Case-Control Studies by Petraityte, Milda et al.
A Model for Android and iOS Applications Risk 
Calculation: CVSS Analysis and Enhancement Using 
Case-Control Studies 
Milda Petraityte1, Ali Dehghantanha2, Gregory Epiphaniou3 
1,2: School of Computing, Science and Engineering, University of Salford- United 
Kingdom 
3: School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Bedfordshire – 
United Kingdom 
 
milda.petraityte@hotmail.com, a.dehghantanha@salford.ac.uk, 
gregory.epiphaniou@beds.ac.uk 
Abstract. Various researchers have shown that the Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) has many drawbacks and may not provide a precise 
view of the risks related to software vulnerabilities. However, many threat 
intelligence platforms and industry-wide standards are relying on CVSS score 
to evaluate cyber security compliance. This paper suggests several 
improvements to the calculation of Impact and Exploitability sub-scores within 
the CVSS, improve its accuracy and help threat intelligence analysts to focus on 
the key risks associated with their assets. We will apply our suggested 
improvements against risks associated with several Android and iOS 
applications and discuss achieved improvements and advantages of our 
modelling, such as the importance and the impact of time on the overall CVSS 
score calculation.   
Keywords: CVSS, Risk Management, Risk Calculation, Vulnerability, 
Exploitability. 
1. Introduction 
The problematics of IT risk management often circle vulnerabilities within IT systems 
and behaviour of people who use those systems [1]. It is, therefore, hard to disagree 
that “there is no 100% security, there is only risk management”[2]. However, one can 
only make informed decisions about risks as effectively as informative and accurate 
are the metrics used for risk evaluation. 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used to calculate the severity of 
vulnerabilities [3] and risks related to IT assets [4]. Industries rely on CVSS as a 
standard way to capture the principal characteristics of vulnerabilities and produce a 
numerical score reflecting their severity. CVSS score is currently used to help the 
organisations to prioritise their vulnerability management process, yet the primary 
purpose of the CVSS is to detail the technical aspects of the vulnerability [4]. 
Furthermore, there is an expectation from organisations to use the CVSS calculation if 
they want to meet the requirements of certifications. For example, Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) requires to ‘perform quarterly external 
vulnerability scans using an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) approved by the 
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)’ [5]. The ASV 
requirements clearly state that ‘wherever possible, the ASV must use the CVSS base 
score for the severity level’ [6]. The ASV reports need to be configured in such a way 
that a card vendor could immediately notice non-compliance and fix any issues ‘to be 
considered compliant, a component must not contain any vulnerability that has been 
assigned a CVSS base score equal to or higher than 4.0.’ [6]. The Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) base their Recommendations to technical, operating 
and tariff questions on CVSS too [7], [8]. Previous recommendations have focused 
solely on CVSS [7], yet the latest report has been dedicated a Common Weakness 
Scoring System [8], which is largely focused on the methodology of CVSS and 
adopts a similar calculation [8].  CVSS score is used alongside Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) numbers. MITRE considers CVE as the 
industry standard to systematically register all discovered software vulnerabilities [9]. 
Before vulnerabilities are registered in a database they are assigned a CVE number 
and a CVSS score which can be used for software product compatibility testing, 
within threat intelligence community to build security alerts and within public watch 
lists such as Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) to rank and manage 
risks [9]. 
However, since the introduction of CVSS there have been numerous complaints 
and suggestions for improvement of its calculation [3], [4], [10]–[13]. The CVSS v.2 
was recently updated, and several changes were introduced, however, several 
researchers have shown that this scoring system does not represent the real level of 
associated risks as well. CVSS exploitability metrics were shown to not correlate 
strongly with the existence of exploits and have a high false positive rate [4], [11]. 
Also, grouping vulnerabilities into High, Medium and Low does not represent the 
distribution of the scores well [14]. Finally, the guidelines of CVSS scoring are not 
being followed [15]. As a result, the data in National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
which contains the latest vulnerabilities with their CVSS scores have poor prediction 
capability [16].  
In addition to the listed issues, neither the documentation of CVSS v2 nor CVSS 
v3 contains a justification of constant values that have been assigned to the 
components within the CVSS formula [17], [18]. The changes within the vulnerability 
ecosystem, such as availability of exploits, patches and updates suggest that 
vulnerabilities do not retain the same risk score over time. While servility of 
vulnerabilities is changing over time, CVSS sub-scores are not sensitive to the 
variation of risk over time. The rapid changes in the Information Security (IS) 
environment require a significant improvement in CVSS score calculation. As stated 
in ISO27001 standard any method that is used for risk assessment should ensure that 
its results are consistent, valid and comparable [19]. Finally, CVSS v2 is not tailored 
to risks imposed to mobile applications [20].  
Mobile devices and their security are quickly becoming a widely recognised issue 
due to various ways that they can be exploited [21]–[23]. A wide range of mobile 
malware forensics and threat hunting models have been developed to fight against 
growing security issues in mobile devices [22], [24], [25]. For example, investigation 
of attackers remnants on mobile social networking applications [26], [27], Voice over 
IP (VoIP) apps [28], mobile cloud storage apps[29], and techniques for mobile 
malware detection [30]. 
Mobile device-related vulnerabilities are also different from those of traditional 
personal computers and laptops [30]. A particular mobile device comes with a pre-
installed operating system (OS) which cannot be changed or replaced. Besides, all 
applications are available via a dedicated application store i.e. Google or Apple app 
stores. These applications undergo provenance – a process of application 
implementation scrutiny for security [31], [32] before they become available for 
download. However, it was shown that manufacturers do not always provide patches 
promptly or sometimes do not provide them at all [20], [33]. 
In this paper, we explain how the formula of CVSS should be adjusted to more 
precisely reflect risks associated with applications vulnerabilities and we explore our 
model applicability by practising it on different mobile device vulnerabilities. We 
discuss the improvements both on impact and exploitability sub-scores, but most 
importantly we introduce the concept of time which reflects how the risk score 
changes over time and when there is an environmental change, i.e. when a proof of 
concept exploit becomes available or when a patch is released.  
The structure of this paper is as follow. The first part focuses on the analysis of 
CVSS score where it is broken down into its components, the Impact and 
Exploitability sub-scores. This part, also explains the data sets of this research as well 
as its collection and analysis. In the second part, we discuss the proposed 
improvements and introduce the new suggested formula and discuss implementation 
results. The third part covers the conclusions with suggestions for future work and 
identified limitations of this study.  
1.1. Background 
Both CVSS v2 and v3 consist of three parts: base score, temporal score and 
environmental score. The base score is the CVSS score assigned once a vulnerability 
is evaluated. Both CVSS v2 and v3 consider temporal and environmental metrics as 
optional, and they are not incorporated into the final CVSS score [17], [34]. 
Furthermore, temporal score still consists of constant values, yet does not have an 
explanation of the reasoning behind such values [18].  
CVSS calculation is modelled according to the risk formula, where the impact is 
multiplied by likelihood, whereas CVSS calls it the sub-metrics of impact and 
exploitability [17]: 
CVSS = Impact x Exploitability (1) 
In formula 1, the impact measures how an exploited vulnerability could affect an asset 
and exploitability measures the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, 
moreover, the vulnerability score becomes higher if it is easy to exploit it. Both 
impact and exploitability scores can be assigned as pre-defined values shown in Table 
1.  
Table 1. Values of Impact and Exploitability sub-scores of CVSS v2 [17] 
Impact Exploitability 
Confidentiality (C) 
Complete (C) 
Partial (P) 
None (N) 
Access Vector (AV) Network (N), 
Adjacent Network (A),  
Local (L) 
Integrity (I) Access Complexity 
(AC) 
High (H),  
Medium (M),  
Low (L) 
Availability (A) Authentication (Au) None (N),  
Single (M), Multiple 
(M) 
1.2. Impact sub-score 
The impact sub-score is evaluated based on the vulnerability effects on the CIA 
(Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) triad [17]. For impact sub-score, CVSS v2 
used values of Complete (C), Partial (P) or None (N) [17], but CVSS v3 has adopted 
the values of High (H), Low (L) and None (N) [18]. The impact sub-score of CVSS 
v2 was obtained using the following formula: 
Impact = 10.41 * (1 - (1 - ConfImpact) * (1 - IntegImpact) * (1 - AvailImpact)) 
 
(2) 
 
Even though the naming of these values in CVSS v3 have been changed and some 
clarification was introduced into the new definitions, it has not uprooted the key issue 
of the evaluation itself.  
The evaluation of ‘None’ means no impact to any of the CIA components, while 
‘Complete’ shows a total compromise of all CIA triad. The definition of ‘None’ and 
‘Complete’ suggests that the definition of ‘Partial’ is very broad. It could be that if 
there is a compromise of a component, but it is not complete, then it automatically 
falls into the category of ‘Partial’. 
Such evaluation introduces a high possibility that the majority of vulnerabilities 
will contain an assessment of ‘Partial’ for all or more than one of the components of 
their impact sub-score. This definition cannot adequately estimate what is the real 
impact of a vulnerability as the scale of ‘Partial’ becomes very broad, namely from 
minimum to near high. The new definition of ‘High’ in CVSS v3 includes not only 
the total compromise of a component but also a significant impact to either of them. 
However, it is still difficult to draw the line and to identify what kind of compromise 
is a significant one and what could be the one of a lower impact. 
The division into the CIA values should make it easier to calculate the Impact 
score and to introduce more variety, however, this does not seem to work as Table 2 
shows a significant amount of greyed-out combinations which are not used within the 
data set. Table 3 and Table 4 shows a condensed version of Table 2 that omits the 
Availability score for a better display of the statistical score and demonstrates the 
percentage of frequency in which these combinations are currently being used. 
Table 2: Incidence of impact for Android (left) and iOS (right) NVD datasets, where impact 
sub-score values demonstrate the combination of possible CIA combinations and their 
distribution across the data sets. Greyed out areas in the combinations never occurred within the 
datasets. 
C I A # Incidence 
C C C 442 54% 
C C P 0 0% 
C C N 1 0.121% 
C P C 0 0% 
C P P 0 0% 
C P N 0 0% 
C N C 3 0.363% 
C N P 0 0% 
C N N 9 1.09% 
P C C 0 0% 
P C P 0 0% 
P C N 0 0% 
P P C 0 0% 
P P P 62 8% 
P P N 58 7% 
P N C 4 0.484% 
P N P 1 0.121% 
P N N 134 16% 
N C C 6 0.726% 
N C P 0 0% 
N C N 0 0% 
N P C 0 0% 
N P P 17 2% 
N P N 54 7% 
N N C 7 0.847% 
N N P 28 3% 
N N N 0 0% 
 
C I A # Incidence 
C C C 187 22% 
C C P 0 0% 
C C N 0 0% 
C P C 0 0% 
C P P 0 0% 
C P N 0 0% 
C N C 0 0% 
C N P 0 0% 
C N N 3 0.355% 
P C C 0 0% 
P C P 0 0% 
P C N 0 0% 
P P C 0 0% 
P P P 293 35% 
P P N 33 4% 
P N C 1 0.118% 
P N P 1 0.118% 
P N N 173 20% 
N C C 3 0.355% 
N C P 0 0% 
N C N 2 0.237% 
N P C 0 0% 
N P P 4 0.473% 
N P N 102 12% 
N N C 18 2% 
N N P 25 3% 
N N N 0 0% 
 Table 3. Combinations of Confidentiality 
and Integrity per dataset: Android, 
obtained from NVD and EDB dataset. 
C I NVD EDB 
C C 53.00% 45.45% 
C P 0.00% 0.00% 
C N 1.08% 9.09% 
P C 0.00% 0.00% 
P P 17.00% 22.73% 
P N 15.70% 13.64% 
N C 0.16% 0.00% 
N P 9.00% 9.09% 
N N 4.18% 0.00% 
 
Table 4. Combinations of Confidentiality 
and Integrity per dataset: iOS, obtained 
from NVD and EDB own dataset. 
C I NVD EDB 
C C 54% 52% 
C P 0% 0% 
C N 1.453% 7% 
P C 0.0% 0% 
P P 15% 24% 
P N 18% 10% 
N C 0.726% 0% 
N P 9% 7% 
N N 4% 0% 
1.3. Exploitability sub-score 
Exploitability sub-score consists of values detailed in the right column of Table 1 and 
is calculated according to the following formula [17]: 
Exploitability = 20 * AccessComplexity * Authentication * AccessVector (3) 
Table 5. Constant values in CVSS v2 calculation formula [17] 
Access Complexity (AC) High: 0.35 
Medium: 0.61 
Low: 0.71 
Authentication (AU) Requires no authentication: 0.704 
Requires single instance of authentication: 0.56 
Requires multiple instances of authentication: 0.45 
Access Vector (AV) Requires local access: 0.395 
Local Network accessible: 0.646 
Network accessible: 1 
Confidentiality Impact (C) None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 
Complete: 0.660 
Integrity Impact (I) None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 
Complete: 0660 
Availability Impact (A) None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 
 
 
Complete: 0660 
Both Impact and Exploitability sub-scores consist of constant values and a 
coefficient that is used to maintain the score between 1 and 10. CVSS v2 constant 
values are displayed in Table 5. However, CVSS v2 documentation does not provide 
any justification of why such numbers or coefficients are used for exploitability sub-
score calculation [17]. 
1.4. Research Data Set 
Reported Android and iOS software vulnerabilities were collected from following well-
known vulnerability databases: 
 National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [35]: the database contains existing 
vulnerabilities which are registered and assigned a reference number. 826 
vulnerabilities were registered for Android and 845 vulnerabilities were 
related to iOS as of 23 May 2016. 
 Exploit Database (EDB) [36]:  contains known exploits for existing 
vulnerabilities which might be listed in NVD. A total of 44 entries found for 
Android platform, out of which 15 have not been linked to a known CVE 
hence disregarded. Out of 142 iOS exploits in EDB only 25 entries were 
associated to a known CVE and used in this research. 
 Vulnerability Lab [37] is another source that maps the registered 
vulnerabilities in NVD and EDB and helps to identify additional 
vulnerabilities.  
 Symantec Connect [38] database was used to map the vulnerability exploit 
data with available patches and proof of concept. 
 
The CVSS scores of related vulnerabilities detected from previously mentioned 
datasets were analysed and compared to understand the distribution of CVSS scores 
across a scale of 1 to 10 according to the current CVSS calculation which was 
discussed previously. CVSS scores range from 1 to 10, where 1 is the lowest 
vulnerability score, and 10 is the highest, or the vulnerability is most critical. Looking 
at the comparison of this data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 it is quite obvious that there are 
CVSS scores with a particularly high amount of data, while some scores have a visibly 
low number of data. Wanting to understand the reason behind such distribution the 
collected dataset spreadsheets, both for Android and iOS, were then used to analyse the 
CVSS the sub-scores of exploitability and impact, which is explained further in detail. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. CVSS score comparison of Android and iOS vulnerabilities across NVD and EDB 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of CVSS scores in Vulnerability Lab 
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1.5. The CVSS Analysis of Data Set 
The analysis of the Impact sub-score data displays two problems. First, Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 display the outcome of a vague evaluation definition. Since the definition of 
Impact values is not informative enough, it is possible that the features of vulnerability 
are not evaluated consistently. Therefore the ‘Partial’ score seems to always fit any 
average impact to either confidentiality, integrity or availability. Second, since the 
evaluation of vulnerabilities often does not reflect the amount of corresponding exploits 
available [4], [11], it is possible that the sub-score values simply do not take into 
consideration the right features of vulnerability which could be better defined, 
evaluated and therefore measured. 
Figure 3 displays how impact score within our dataset is distributed across the scale 
of 1-10. It is visible that the score mainly consists of 3 values. 
 
Figure 3. Impact sub-score distribution across Android and iOS datasets in NVD and EDB. 
The exploitability sub-score within the dataset was analysed to understand its 
distribution within the scoring scale of 1-10, the way it was done when analysing the 
Impact sub-score. The results displayed in Figure 4 show that the largest number of 
vulnerabilities contain an Exploitability score of either 3, or mostly 8 and 10, while 
other scores are low in number. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Exploitability sub-score distribution across Android and iOS datasets in NVD and 
EDB. 
1.6. Proposed Model 
In this research we have access to data of existing vulnerabilities and registered 
exploits, however, this data does not give a drilled down details of a particular use case 
and how it was remediated if it was at all. It is not possible to know how many devices 
were affected where a vulnerability was exploited and what happened to it over time. 
Moreover, the exploit data of mobile devices is very limited, especially for iOS.  
The level of variances in this research make it hard to provide comparable results. 
In such situations, a Randomised Block Design method can be used to compare an 
individual experiment on several homogenous groups to reduce variances that could 
impact the study [39]. A comparison is made between two seemingly similar object 
groups or blocks, where the behaviour of one object group has been analysed and 
understood. The same features of such two object groups allow to predict and suggest 
the reaction of the other object group. Therefore, in this research, we compare the data 
of Android and iOS vulnerabilities and exploits with human viruses and diseases. 
There was a variety of studies which successfully adopted the same semantics to 
describe the disease of a computer system as it was long used to describe a disease in a 
human body [40]–[42]. In the case of computer systems the system patches and updates 
is a reaction to any new or existing vulnerability. The concept of changing virus life 
cycle over time could potentially help to understand how the introduction of time sub-
metric makes the score of a vulnerability more accurate [43]–[45]. Overall, the 
 
 
vulnerability lifecycle may have several critical points that could be approximately 
matched to a biological virus as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Comparison of critical points between a biological virus and a vulnerability 
Biological virus Vulnerability 
Virus discovery Vulnerability found 
Virus is researched/understood Proof of concept provided 
Infected individuals reported Exploit is available 
Virus treatment discovered Software patch available 
Virus treated Software update pushed to the mobile devices 
Despite the similarities, computer and viruses differ in their survival behaviour. 
Surviving probability of computer viruses drop sharply over the first two months of 
their life. Statistically just a small percentage of them cause an outbreak in the 
computer community, while those viruses that survive still decay over time depending 
on their type [46]. As for human viruses, some of them (i.e. polio, measles, rubella, 
etc.) never completely disappear but are dormant due to existing preventive controls 
(i.e. good hygiene or vaccination), yet when these controls are removed due to any 
circumstances the viruses infect populations. This behaviour could not be associated 
with computer viruses since a patch is supposed to provide appropriate protection for a 
vulnerability and for this reason it should not be possible to infect the system using the 
same vulnerability.  
For this reason, a more suitable function to mathematically reflect the declining 
spread of a computer virus would be a mathematical function rather than a line, i.e. 
constant number. Actuarial science has long used Panjer’s Recursion Formula (PRF) to 
calculate cumulative risks for the insurance purposes [47], [48]. In the insurance 
industry, collective risk models are used to evaluate processes that produce claims over 
time [47]. In our case, it resembles to risk score over time where variables are 
independent and identically distributed events that could impact the change of the risk 
score [47] such as the development of an exploit or the opposite – a system patch. 
These events are independent in the sense that they are not necessarily generated by the 
same subject, one event could occur before another, and one could occur without the 
existence of the other. One of the techniques to calculate these independent events is 
using PRF as shown in Figure 5.  
PRF as shown in formula 4 is a sum of the independent variables that re-occur 
constantly, where N is a random variable with a value of i. In our case N is some 
exploits for a particular vulnerability and is independent X, that is time over which an 
exploit or a number of exploits for that particular vulnerability is available.  
        
 
   
 (4) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The graph of Panjer’s Recursion Formula, taken from [48] 
Using PRF, we assume that every month there is an equal probability for a new 
critical point to appear, which is in our case an existence of an exploit or a development 
of a patch. We also make an assumption that if a new critical point appears in the 
environment of a vulnerability, it does not mean that there will be no more critical 
points appearing for the same vulnerability in that month. In other words, the 
appearance of one critical point is independent from the appearance of any other 
critical point. 
Formula 4 could also be an alternative to Monte Carlo simulation [48]. Its key 
advantage is that the complete aggregate distribution of claims for a given block of 
policies may be quickly calculated and the simulation time decreases nearly 60% [48], 
[49].  
PRF is effective when calculating the recursive events, but it has received criticism 
in the past that the initialisation of the formula is not clear and could introduce 
variances. Therefore, Guegan & Hassani [48] have modified the algorithm which mixes 
Monte Carlo simulation, PRFand kernel smoothing by way of introducing either 
Binomial or Poisson distributions to the core formula. Poisson distribution is suitable to 
calculate the total amount of events during a particular time span, while Binomial 
distribution calculates only positive events during that time. Since we are interested in 
the amount of total events during the lifetime of vulnerability, therefore the inclusion of 
Poisson distribution to Panjer’s PRF is more suitable to satisfy the requirement of the 
overall CVSS score calculation (see Formula 5). Where e is the exponential limit, λ is a 
mean or an average of critical points per month and κ is the probability of the event: 
 
 
S     
 
    , where    
   
 
  
, where      and     (5) 
The formula should be the sum of all critical point components that are available as 
data for each vulnerability. Hence, taking into consideration all the components of 
exploitability sub-score.  
1.7. Results and Discussion  
The analysis of the Impact sub-score showed that the CIA evaluation within the Impact 
sub-score was too broad and too many vulnerabilities could have fallen under an 
evaluation of ‘Partial’ impact as it lacked a clear definition. Also, there is a difference 
in the severity of a vulnerability depending on whether it is an OS vulnerability or the 
one which exists within a vulnerable application. Therefore, the CIA score evaluation 
of ‘Partial’ could be distinguished into two scores, which separate the vulnerabilities 
apply to applications and OS. For this research, we named the suggested value for 
application evaluation ‘Partial-Application’ and the value related to OS ‘Partial-
System’. The structure together with suggested calculation for each of these values is 
shown in Table 7. Following the approach of the old CVSS formula the coefficients of 
0.461 for the Partial-Application and 0.515 for the Partial-System value were 
introduced, where coefficient for the vulnerabilities related to OS takes more weight 
due to their potentially higher impact.  
Table 7. Suggested breakdown of Impact sub-score evaluation 
CIA Impact Current constant values Suggested constant values 
Confidentiality Impact (C) None: 0 None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 Partial-Application: 0.461 
Partial-System: 0.515 
Complete: 0.660 Complete: 0.660 
Integrity Impact (I) None: 0 None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 Partial-Application: 0.461 
Partial-System: 0.515 
Complete: 0.660 Complete: 0.660 
Availability Impact (A) None: 0 None: 0 
Partial: 0.275 Partial-Application: 0.461 
Partial-System: 0.515 
Complete: 0.660 Complete: 0.660 
During the implementation of the suggested method, the vulnerabilities within our 
datasets were separated into either application or OS vulnerabilities. The recommended 
coefficients were then applied to these vulnerabilities, and a new CVSS Impact sub-
score was calculated. After the implementation, another comparison of vulnerability 
score distribution within the dataset was performed to evaluate how the suggested 
method changed the values of CVSS score. The result displayed in Figure 6 shows that 
only the change of a value within one sub-score of CVSS could make a significant 
difference to the overall evaluation of vulnerabilities and their distribution across the 
scores. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Recalculated CVSS scores with an improvement of adding additional value to the 
Impact sub-score. 
However, the split of the ‘Partial’ score into application or OS vulnerabilities only 
improved the definition and use of the ‘Partial’ value of the Impact sub-score. It is 
possible that the evaluation of ‘Complete’ should also be reviewed as part of a future 
research as there are still proportionally high amounts of vulnerabilities with CIA 
impact of ‘Complete’ making more than 50% of the entire mobile vulnerability 
population for both Android and iOS vulnerabilities. This could be one of the reasons 
why there are large amounts of vulnerabilities with highest CVSS scores. 
To improve the Exploitability sub-score, it is necessary to use the PRF Formula 5. 
The previous discussion suggests that there could be as many as five critical points of 
vulnerability (see Table 6). However, not all of this information will be available for all 
vulnerabilities as a vulnerability may not yet have an exploit or a patch. The amount of 
these critical points would only improve the accuracy of the overall score, without 
rendering it invalid.  
A test with only one critical point would help to back up the above claim. However, 
to test the effectiveness of the model, we aimed to test the vulnerabilities with as many 
critical points as possible. Hence, the experiment was applied on vulnerabilities that 
have an exploit, i.e. are registered with EDB. As of 26 May 2016 Symantec Connect 
[38] contained three critical points of registered vulnerability exploits within our 
dataset: availability of proof of concept (POF), an exploit and a patch. 
 
 
Formula 5 was used to experiment the collected data set run on vulnerabilities that 
had one critical point, then two critical points and finally three. The Exploitability score 
was derived according to the age of the vulnerability counting the months since its 
registration until June 2016. This score was used for calculation of the CVSS base 
score. 
To be able to calculate the new CVSS scores the suggested model was incorporated 
into the current CVSS base score calculation. The impact sub-score is re-calculated 
with new CIA values, and PRF was used for calculation of Exploitability as shown in 
Formula 6. 
                                                   (6) 
Having applied Formula 6 to the data set it is possible to demonstrate that the 
number of critical points does not make an essential difference to the effectiveness of 
the Formula 6, yet it provides more accuracy to the overall vulnerability score. Figure 7 
displays how a number of critical points improved the accuracy of the calculation and 
therefore the vulnerability score. However, it does not change the overall principle of 
how the score changes over several months, as displayed in Figure 7a, 7b and 7c. 
 
Figure 7. CVSS exploitability score change according to the new CVSS calculation model. 
Graphs display the vulnerability score change over two years (in months) when a) there is one 
critical point, b) two critical points, c) three critical points discovered 
The analysis of the present calculation of the CVSS score has exposed some 
problems. First, the vulnerabilities do not seem to be measured against their true 
characteristics which result in vague evaluation system of the overall CVSS score. 
 
 
Second, the changing technologies require constant monitoring of whether or not the 
CVSS result of vulnerability is still relevant. Furthermore, a systematic collection of 
the data showed that there were large amounts of vulnerabilities that retained repeated 
values across all of their sub-scores, i.e. a CVSS score of 6.8 will always have an 
Impact sub-score of 6.4 and Exploitability sub-score of 8.6. The analysis of their 
breakdown values also appeared to be always the same, most likely due to vague 
vulnerability evaluation system. This could be one of the reasons why the overall 
distribution of the CVSS scores across the data set was concentrated at only several 
scores. Therefore the CVSS calculation does not satisfy the purpose that it was 
designed for. 
The suggested Formula 5 introduces a difficulty in updating the scores of existing 
vulnerabilities as time goes and a critical point is discovered. This would require a 
strong collaboration between the administration of National Vulnerability Database and 
Exploit Database team, which is not being done at the moment. It would also require 
more sophistication in a website design of NVD, where a ‘forecast’ calculation could 
potentially be introduced, showing how vulnerability is expected to decrease over time 
provided a critical point is not discovered.  
2. Conclusions and Future Works 
Various researchers have shown that the CVSS score calculation has several drawbacks 
and does not reflect the real situation of the vulnerability risk. However, a number of 
industry-wide standards use CVSS score to evaluate cyber security compliance, and 
there is generally a lot of reliance on the scoring system. 
Our suggested model improved calculation and distribution of the CVSS base score. 
However, the formula should be further improved to entirely replace the constant 
values within the existing formula with those that are dynamic and true representatives 
of properties of vulnerabilities. Even though the suggested model improved the way 
that the mobile device vulnerabilities are calculated, there is potentially an overall 
limitation in how the nature of vulnerability is perceived and therefore evaluated. It 
was particularly evident in the way vulnerabilities were evaluated for CIA within the 
Impact sub-score, where some values were never in use for extracted vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, a potential future work could focus on investigating what the metrics that 
would allow an accurate evaluation of vulnerabilities according to the meaningful 
qualities are.  
Another limitation of this research is that we have the data of existing 
vulnerabilities and registered exploits. However this data does not give a drilled down 
details of a particular exploit case and how it was remediated if it was at all. Therefore, 
it is not possible to know how many devices were infected with a virus where a 
vulnerability was exploited and what happened to it over time. Moreover, the scope of 
the research is limited to the vulnerabilities related to mobile device software and 
applications only, and therefore further research should be conducted on different types 
of data to confirm suggested model effectiveness. 
 
 
References 
[1] A. Shameli-Sendi, R. Aghababaei-Barzegar, and M. Cheriet, “Taxonomy of Information 
Security Risk Assessment (ISRA),” Comput. Secur., vol. 57, pp. 14–30, 2016. 
[2] W. Ahsford, “Sony data breach: 100m reasons to beef up security,” 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280097348/Sony-data-breach-100m-reasons-to-
beef-up-security. [Accessed: 14-May-2016]. 
[3] H. Li, R. Xi, and L. Zhao, “Study on the Distribution of CVSS Environmental Score,” pp. 1–
4, 2015. 
[4] L. Allodi and F. Massacci, “Comparing vulnerability severity and exploits using case-control 
studies,” (Rank B)ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst., vol. 9, no. 4, 2013. 
[5] PCI SSC, “Payment Card Industry (PCI) Card Production: Logical Security Requirements,” 
no. May. 2013. 
[6] PCI SSC, “Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard: Technical and Operational 
Requirements for Approved Scanning Vendors (ASVs),” October, vol. 21, no. October. 2010. 
[7] ITU-T, “Series X: Data Networks, Open System Communications and Security. Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System,” 2011. 
[8] ITU-T, “Series X: Data Networks, Open System Communications and Security. Common 
Weakness Scoring System,” 2015. 
[9] MITRE.ORG, “CVE,” 2016. [Online]. Available: https://cve.mitre.org/index.html. [Accessed: 
04-Sep-2015]. 
[10] L. Gallon, “On the impact of environmental metrics on CVSS scores,” Proc. - Soc. 
2010 2nd IEEE Int. Conf. Soc. Comput. PASSAT 2010 2nd IEEE Int. Conf. Privacy, Secur. 
Risk Trust, pp. 987–992, 2010. 
[11] A. A. Younis and Y. K. Malaiya, “Comparing and Evaluating CVSS Base Metrics and 
Microsoft Rating System,” no. 1, 2015. 
[12] P. Toomey, “CVSS – Vulnerability Scoring Gone Wrong,” 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://labs.neohapsis.com/2012/04/25/cvss-vulnerability-scoring-gone-wrong/. [Accessed: 03-
Jan-2016]. 
[13] C. Frühwirth and T. Männistö, “Improving CVSS-based vulnerability prioritization and 
response with context information,” 2009 3rd Int. Symp. Empir. Softw. Eng. Meas. ESEM 
2009, pp. 535–544, 2009. 
[14] P. Toomey, “CVSS – Vulnerability Scoring Gone Wrong | Neohapsis Labs on 
WordPress.com,” 2012. [Online]. Available: https://labs.neohapsis.com/2012/04/25/cvss-
vulnerability-scoring-gone-wrong/. [Accessed: 14-May-2016]. 
[15] C. Eiram and B. Martin, “The CVSSv2 Shortcomings, Faults, and Failures 
Formulation.” pp. 1–13, 2013. 
[16] S. Zhang, X. Ou, and D. Caragea, “Predicting Cyber Risks through National 
Vulnerability Database,” Inf. Secur. J. A Glob. Perspect., vol. 24, no. 4–6, pp. 194–206, Nov. 
2015. 
[17] FIRST, “CVSS v2 Complete Documentation,” 2007. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.first.org/cvss/v2/guide. [Accessed: 16-May-2016]. 
[18] FIRST, “CVSS v3.0 Preview,” 2014. 
[19] British Standard Institution (BSI), “ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information technology - 
Security techniques - Information security management systems Requirements,” Br. Stand. 
Online, no. December 2015, 2015. 
[20] D. R. Thomas, Beresford, Alastair R., and A. Rice, “Security Metrics for the Android 
Ecosystem,” in Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy 
in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, 2015, pp. 87–98. 
[21] F. N. Dezfouli, A. Dehghantanha, B. Eterovic-Soric, and K.-K. R. Choo, “Investigating 
Social Networking applications on smartphones detecting Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and 
Google+ artefacts on Android and iOS platforms,” Aust. J. Forensic Sci., 2015. 
 
 
[22] M. Damshenas, A. Dehghantanha, K.-K. R. Choo, and R. Mahmud, “M0Droid: An 
Android Behavioral-Based Malware Detection Model,” J. Inf. Priv. Secur., vol. 11, no. 3, Sep. 
2015. 
[23] A. Dehghantanha, N. I. Udzir, and R. Mahmod, “Towards Data Centric Mobile 
Security,” IEEE, no. 7th International Conference on Information Assurance and Security 
(IAS), pp. 62–67, 2011. 
[24] N. Milosevic, A. Dehghantanha, and K.-K. R. Choo, “Machine learning aided Android 
malware classification, Computers & Electrical Engineering.” [Online]. Available: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2017.02.013. 
[25] M. Petraityte, A. Dehghantanha, and G. Epiphaniou, “Mobile Phone Forensics: An 
Investigative Framework Based on User Impulsivity and Secure Collaboration Errors,” in 
Contemporary Digital Forensic Investigations Of Cloud And Mobile Applications, 2016, pp. 
79–89. 
[26] M. Najwadi Yusoff, A. Dehghantanha, and R. Mahmod, “Forensic Investigation of 
Social Media and Instant Messaging Services in Firefox OS: Facebook, Twitter, Google+, 
Telegram, OpenWapp, and Line as Case Studies,” in Contemporary Digital Forensic 
Investigations Of Cloud And Mobile Applications, 2016, pp. 41–62. 
[27] F. Nourozizadeh, A. Dehghantanha, and K.-K. R. Choo, “Investigating Social 
Networking applications on smartphones detecting Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+ 
artefacts on Android and iOS platforms,” Aust. J. Forensics Sci., 2014. 
[28] T. Dargahi, A. Dehghantanha, and M. Conti, “Forensics Analysis of Android Mobile 
VoIP Apps,” in Contemporary Digital Forensic Investigations Of Cloud And Mobile 
Applications, 2016, pp. 7–20. 
[29] M. Amine Chelihi, A. Elutilo, I. Ahmed, C. Papadopoulos, and A. Dehghantanha, “An 
Android Cloud Storage Apps Forensic Taxonomy,” in Contemporary Digital Forensic 
Investigations Of Cloud And Mobile Applications, 2016, pp. 285–305. 
[30] K. Shaerpour, A. Dehghantanha, and R. Mahmod, “Trends in Android Malware 
Detection.,” J. Digit. Forensics, Secur. Law, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 21–40, 2013. 
[31] I. Mohamed and D. Patel, “Android vs iOS Security: A Comparative Study,” 2015 
12th Int. Conf. Inf. Technol. - New Gener., pp. 725–730, 2015. 
[32] Google, “Android Security: 2015 Year in Review,” 2015. 
[33] F. Daryabar, A. Dehghantanha, B. Eterovic-Soricc, and K.-K. R. Choo, “Forensic 
investigation of OneDrive, Box, GoogleDrive and Dropbox applications on Android and iOS 
devices,” Taylor Fr. Online, no. 0618 (March), pp. 1–28, 2016. 
[34] First, “Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS-SIG).” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.first.org/cvss. [Accessed: 02-Jan-2016]. 
[35] NIST, “National Vulnerability Database,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://nvd.nist.gov/home.cfm. [Accessed: 05-Aug-2015]. 
[36] Offensive Security, “Exploit Database,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.exploit-db.com/. [Accessed: 10-Aug-2015]. 
[37] Vulnerability Lab, “Mobile Vulnerabilities,” 2016. . 
[38] Security Focus, “Symantec Connect,” 2016. 
[39] W. C. for S. R. Methods, “Randomized Block Designs,” 2006. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/expblock.php. 
[40] R. Pastor-Satorras, C. Castellano, P. Van Mieghem, and A. Vespignani, “Epidemic 
processes in complex networks,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 1–62, 2015. 
[41] E. Valdano, L. Ferreri, C. Poletto, and V. Colizza, “Analytical computation of the 
epidemic threshold on temporal networks,” arXiv Prepr., vol. 21005, no. 2, p. 19, 2014. 
[42] G. F. De Arruda, E. Cozzo, P. Tiago, F. A. Rodrigues, and Y. Moreno, “Multiple 
Transitions and Disease Localization in Multilayer Networks,” Final Draft. Submitt. Publ., 
pp. 1–18, 2016. 
[43] G. F. Brooks, J. S. Butel, and S. A. Morse, Medical Microbiology. 2015. 
 
 
[44] Scitable, “Host Response to the Dengue Virus,” Scitable, 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/host-response-to-the-dengue-virus-22402106. 
[Accessed: 14-May-2016]. 
[45] A. Boianelli, V. K. Nguyen, T. Ebensen, K. Schulze, E. Wilk, N. Sharma, S. 
Stegemann-Koniszewski, D. Bruder, F. R. Toapanta, C. A. Guzmán, M. Meyer-Hermann, and 
E. A. Hernandez-Vargas, “Modeling Influenza Virus Infection: A Roadmap for Influenza 
Research,” Viruses, vol. 7, no. 10, pp. 5274–304, Oct. 2015. 
[46] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, “Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks,” 
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 86, no. 14, pp. 3200–3203, 2001. 
[47] R. Kaas, M. Goovaerts, J. Dhaene, and M. Denuit, Modern Actuarial Risk Theory, vol. 
53. 2008. 
[48] D. Guegan and B. K. Hassani, “A modified Panjer algorithm for operational risk 
capital calculations,” J. Oper. Risk, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 53–72, 2009. 
[49] L. Spencer and L. Re, “An Overview of the Panjer Method for Deriving the Aggregate 
Claims Distribution,” 2000. 
 
